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This chapter aims to prove that the ultimate consequence of any rational epistemics of divine               
reality is monism or non-dualism. This is so because the rationality of reality implies unity,               
necessity, immutability, transcendence, and infinity as will be proved in this chapter, and             
therefore in order to make a rational sense out of reality, reason rejects all experience as an                 
illusion. This will be proved through a study of Greek monism and ​Advaintin non-dualism. At               
the end, Kant’s Phenomenalism will be studied to see how he attempts to solve the problem of                 
the rationality of reality, though it will be shown that his epistemics only tends towards               
subjectivity, skepticism, and agnosticism. The study of each system will be followed by a              
critique, by the researcher, of the same at the end of each section. 
‘Rational epistemics of divine reality’ may be defined as the study of the epistemic procedures of                
metaphysical theories on divine reality that regard reason as their chief source of knowledge.              
‘Reason’ may be defined as the capacity for inference and rational thought. In common parlance,               
reason refers to that faculty of the human knowing process that ensures certainty, consistency,              
and purity in the field of knowledge. It can be distinguished from experience as the source of                 
knowledge that does not require exhaustive sense-perceptions of all reality to verify it, but is               
verified as self-evident by reason itself. Since rational epistemics has reason as its basis it is                
referred to as being rational. In this chapter, the results of the rational attempts at the knowledge                 
of God will be studied in order to see whether reason is a reliable source or guide of divine                   
knowledge. 
The Quest for Rational Certainty in Epistemology 
Rationalism may be defined as the epistemic theory that holds that only knowledge derived or               
based on reason are certain. It believes in the existence of some ​a priori ​knowledge, i.e.,                
knowledge that does not originate in sense experience, though it may find validation through it.               
These ​a priori ​truths are regarded to be real. Experience is considered to be unreliable as the                 
senses are unreliable. The bent spoon in a glass of water, a mirage, and a motion picture based on                   
the persistence of vision are all indicative that sense experience is not a reliable guide to truth.                 
However, the laws of logic (like the law of non-contradiction that states that A=B ≠ A≠B) are                 
doubtlessly held as axiomatic. In the same way, statements like ‘every effect must have a cause’                
and ‘every object occupies space’ are considered to be axiomatic truths that are crucial to any                
rational analysis. It is only through reasoning based on some fundamental ​a priori ​truths that all                
truths are thought to be established.  
The quest of reason for certainty in knowledge can be described as follows. Truth is expressed in                 
statements. Statements are sentences that possess meaning. Statements of truth are those            
propositions that possess absolute meaning. ​A priori ​or rational truths have at least five              
characteristics that distinguish them as rational truths; they are: unity, necessity, immutability,            
transcendence, and strict universality. 
Unity refers to the identity, exclusivity, and non-ambiguity of truth. Truth is one. A rational truth                
is singular and exclusive. Thus, 2+2=4 means that 2+2=4 and not 2+2=5. In the same manner,                
‘All bodies are extended’ expresses the predicate as contained in the subject; thus, identical and               
one.  
To say that truth is a unity also means that it is subject to the law of non-contradiction. The law                    
of non-contradiction states that it cannot be true both that a proposition is true and also that it is                   
false; not both ​p and not-​p (e.g., ‘A rose cannot be not a rose’). This excludes all possibility of                   1
relativizing truth. Though truth is subjective (as it is subjective knowledge of objective reality) it               
is not arbitrarily decided. It is subjectively discovered not determined. Thus, if one holds              
something to be true (say, it is raining) which someone else doesn’t hold to be true (say, it is not                    
raining), then a contradiction is obvious and both of them cannot be true at the same time. Either                  
one is true or the other is true; not both true at the same time. The law of non-contradiction itself                    
is a self-validating truth. It cannot be falsified. Thus truth must be singular and exclusive in                
nature. 
Another feature of rational truths is necessity. This differentiates them from empirical truths             
which are contingent. Rational truths cannot be thought as non-existent. For instance, ‘All bodies              
occupy space’ is discovered through experience, of course, but there can never be imagined a               
body that does not occupy space. Thus, ‘body’ and ‘space’ are rationally connected and the               
concept of space becomes necessary for the concept of body. In the same manner, it does of                 
necessity follow that 2+2 = 4. Likewise, the laws of reason are necessary rational truths. They                
are necessary for any reasoning to occur. Without them no reasoning is possible. 
Rational truths cannot be considered to be fluctuating as the material world is. Truth must be                
immutable in nature. For if truth is inconsistent and changeable, no statement of truth can be                
regarded to be absolute. Therefore, truth is unchangeable. 
For rational truths to be immutable they must be beyond the fluctuating effects of time and                
matter. This is what is meant by the transcendence of truth. Rationalists do agree that rational                
truths are above and over empirical truths. Plato’s world of ideas is one example of such                
transcendent conception of rational truths. 
By strict universality is meant that rational truths are not conditioned by any location. Thus, 2+2                
= 4 is true on earth and also on Pluto. 
Thus, rational truth is basically understood as possessing the qualities of unity, necessity,             
eternity, universality, immutability, and transcendence. It will be seen in this chapter that when              2
knowledge about ultimate reality is sought through rational epistemics, all the above or most of               
1 Hunnex, ​Charts​, p. 4 
2 Alister E. McGrath, ​The Making of Modern German Christology 1750-1990, ​2​nd​ edn. (Grand Rapids: Zondervan 
Publishing House, 1993), p. 31 
the features of truth mentioned above are anticipated as features of ultimate reality itself in some                
way or the other. This, the researcher, contends to be what the rational epistemics of divine                
reality is all about. The absolute nature of truth is projected on to reality itself. Thus, whatever                 
one calls God to be, this world or a wholly other being, God is posited as One (unity),                  
Self-existent (necessity), Immutable, Spirit (transcendence), and Infinite (universality). This         
chapter aims to uncover this nature of rational epistemics in the theories of the leading               
rationalists. 
Rationalism can be found in the thoughts of several philosophers in both the Western and               
Eastern tradition. However, its full fledged development as a modern methodology was realized             
in the thought of the seventeenth century French philosopher and mathematician Rene Descartes             
(1596-1650), who proposed that certainty in philosophy can be achieved in the same way as in                3
mathematics through the skeptical rational method. Exactitude and indubitability were goals that            
Descartes desired to achieve in the field of knowledge. Descartes’ argument for the existence of               
God is a classic example of the modernist (rationalist) attempt to arrive at a rational certainty in                 
theology. 
Among the various rationalists are notably Plato (ca. 428-348 B.C.), Saint Augustine (354-430),             
Benedict Spinoza (1632-1677), Rene Descartes (1596-1650), Gottfried Wilhelm Leibnitz         
(1646-1716), and George Hegel (1770-1831).  4
The Conflict of Reason and Reality in Rational Epistemics 
At face value, the striking dissimilarities between ​a priori knowledge and ​a posteriori             
knowledge are evident. Unity, necessity, transcendence, immutability, and strict universality are           
characteristic of all truths ​given ​a priori​. Conversely, plurality (diversity), contingency,           
immanence, change, and temporality are characteristic of all objects perceive ​a posteriori.            
Therefore, the quest of the rationalists has been to find a unified, necessary, transcendent,              
immutable, and universal ground of all diverse, contingent, immanent, changing, and temporal            
reality. The word ‘universe’ as such describes the philosophical search for unity in diversity; the               
whole reality as conceived of as somehow essentially one. 
The Eleatic School. ​The Eleatic school of philosophy, deriving its name from the Greek city of                
Elea, in southern Italy, the home of Parmenides (c. 500 B.C.) and Zeno, the leading exponents of                 
the school, flourished in the sixth and fifth centuries B.C. Many of the Eleatic doctrines are based                 
upon the teachings of Xenophanes, though the systematization of them into metaphysics was             
done by Parmenides. Parmenides taught that the world as it appears to us is an illusion. In truth,                  5
there is neither movement of objects nor the objects themselves in their diversity. Reality is not                
known to the senses but is to be found only in reason. Reality or True Being neither comes into                   
nor goes out of existence. It is eternal, indivisible, and unchanging. The theories of both               
3 “Rationalism,” ​Microsoft Encarta Encyclopedia​ (Microsoft Corporation, 2001) 
4 Velasquez, ​Philosophy​, p. 289 
5 “Eleatic School,” ​Microsoft Encarta Encyclopedia​ (Microsoft Corporation, 2001) 
Pythagoras and Heraclitus are, thus, annulled; and in Parmenides, the Grecian quest for unity in               
diversity reaches its rational apex. 
Regarding the nature of this singular reality, the following arguments are presented by             
Parmenides: 
Argument from Change 
1. To think of change requires thinking of something in terms of what it is not. 
2. But reality, or being, is what it is and not something else. 
3. Therefore, it is impossible to think of change in any clear way since the only thing one                 
can think about is being, or what actually is.  6
To think that being changes, one has to also think of it in terms of something it is not (something                    
changes when it becomes something different from what it is in the present); and something other                
than being is non-being. However, it is impossible to think of non-being (to think of non-being                
means to think of nothing). Therefore, it is impossible to think of change in any clear way. Thus,                  
this argument proves the non-rationality of empirical mutability. However, it is a weak argument              
since it only proves that no essential change can take place in the nature of being but doesn’t                  
show why that being cannot change in relation to something else. For instance, to say that water                 
becomes ice doesn’t mean that water and ice differ in the essentiality of being, but as different in                  
relation to form: liquid or solid.  
Argument from Coming-into-being 
1. For something to arise out of non-being and come into being, non-being must be              
something, which it is not; therefore to say that something comes into being out of               
non-being is absurd. 
2. To say that something arises out of being means that it already is. Therefore, there cannot                
be a coming-into-being out of being.  7
3. Therefore, reality or being can neither be considered to have come out of non-being nor               
out of being. If it is not, it cannot be; if it is then, it cannot become. 
This argument is based on the assumption that something cannot come out of nothing. Therefore,               
being can only come out of non-being if non-being were something, but non-being is nothing;               
and since something cannot come out of nothing, it is absurd to suppose that being came out of                  
non-being. However, to say that being came into being out of being is to suppose that being is                  
already in existence before it comes into being, which is contradictory and impossible. Therefore,              
it is also absurd to suppose that being came out of being. 
The above argument is based on the assumption that being is one. So, if all being is one, it must                    
have either always been or could not ever be; anyway, it could not be self-generated. This                
rational necessity of being is inescapable. Since being is, therefore, it cannot have been              
6 Samuel Enoch Stumpf, ​Socrates to Sartre​, p. 16 
7 ​Ibid,​ pp. 16, 17 
generated. This argument, however, fails to see the difference between necessary being and             
contingent being, as Classical Christian theology sees. Only the Divine exists as a necessary              
eternal being. All other is contingent upon the Divine and created by Him. It must be admitted,                 
however, that this Christian notion of created contingency is not a rational achievement but a               
revealed doctrine. The fact of the matter is that rational philosophy can only admit and “see” that                 
something cannot proceed out of nothing. Even Aristotle’s Prime Mover can only be a mover               
with respect to a universe that already is; it does not create the universe out of nothing and then                   
moves them.  In Will Durant’s words, “God does not create, but he moves, the world…”  8 9
Thus, it has been seen that the Ionian philosophers had searched for unity in diversity, for a                 
permanent reality underlying change. Heraclitus, however, concluded that change itself was the            
only thing that was permanent. According to him, the search for a permanent material substratum               
is profitless. But, then, Parmenides came and denied even the reality of change. Change,              
according to Parmenides was impossible. Whenever change is thought about, the result is             
incoherent. Further, Parmenides has argued that reality or being is one, permanent,            10
ungenerated, indestructible, and unchanging. The rational search for ultimate reality thus ended            
in monism.  
To the attacks of the pluralists, Zeno of Elea, disciple of Parmenides offered several arguments               
in form of paradoxes that demonstrated the utter absurdity of commonsense realism. Since             
absurdity is a sign of falsity, it is false that reality is many. Hence, Zeno argues that reality must                   
be one. It may be noted that the paradox may also mean, contrary to Zeno’s contention, that                 
reason is false and experience is true. However, since it is difficult to label reason as false                 
without the use of reason itself, the certainty of rational reality looms over that of experience.                
Few of Zeno’s most famous proofs are as follows: 
The Paradoxes of Plurality 
The Argument from Denseness 
If there are many, they must be as many as they are and neither more nor less than that.                   
But if they are as many as they are, they would be limited. If there are many, things                  
that are are unlimited. For there are always others between the things that are, and               
again others between those, and so the things that are are unlimited.  
11
The paradox is that things appear to be as many as they are, that is as limited, whereas rationally                   
speaking they must be unlimited; a pair of two is separated by a third, which pairing with its next                   
is separated by a fourth, and so on ​ad infinitum. Thus, the view that reality is many, or numbered                   
plurality, involves a rational impossibility.  
8 Justin D. Kaplan (ed.), ​The Pocket Aristotle​, pp. 138, 148, 155 (See 5. Aristotle’s Observations, below) 
9 Will Durant, ​The Story of Philosophy​, p.71 
10 “Parmenides: Stage 1,” http://faculty.washington.edu/smcohen/320/parm1.htm 
11 Simplicius as cited in “Zeno’s Paradoxes,” http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/paradox-zeno/ 
The assumption is that it takes something to separate an other. That means that if the ‘separator’                 
theory is abandoned the paradox doesn’t exist. Why can’t it be said that the things are separated                 
by the void? In that sense, the void (meaning nothing) could rationally not separate anything; for                
to be separated by nothing is not to be separated at all. However, if empirically understood, the                 
void (space) separates things in the sense that in between things there is the void. Thus, the                 
rational-empirical paradoxical situation is not resolved but heightened by the different meanings            
of void by reason and experience. The paradox, consequently exists because the rational             
(immaterial) is applied to the empirical (material) and the fusion creates an either/or situation in               
which experience is ultimately dismissed as illusion. 
The Argument from Finite Size 
… if it should be added to something else that exists, it would not make it any bigger. For if it                     
were of no size and was added, it cannot increase in size. And so it follows                
immediately that what is added is nothing. But if when it is subtracted, the other thing                
is no smaller, nor is it increased when it is added, clearly the thing being added or                 
subtracted is nothing. 
But if it exists, each thing must have some size and thickness, and part of it must be apart from                    
the rest. And the same reasoning holds concerning the part that is in front. For that too                 
will have size and part of it will be in front. Now it is the same thing to say this once                     
and to keep saying it forever. For no such part of it will be last, nor will there be one                    
part not related to another. Therefore, if there are many things, they must be both small                
and large; so small as not to have size, but so large as to be unlimited.  
12
The first part of the argument which purports to show that if there are many things they cannot                  
possess size is missing. The second part shows that if they do not possess size they are nothing.                  
The third part shows that if reality is plural and, thus, composed of different parts, the following                 
paradox results: Each part is divided into a front and a rear part. Each front and the rear part have                    
a front and a rear part of their own respectively, and so on ​ad infinitum​. Thus, the size would be                    
zero and unlimited, which is paradoxical. 
The Argument from Complete Divisibility 
1. If a line segment is composed of a multiplicity of points, then the line segment is                
infinitely divisible; that is to say an infinite number of bisections can be made in it. One                 
cannot come to a point where further bisection of the line segment is not mathematically               
possible. No singular point can thus be found. Therefore, a line segment is not composed               
of a multiplicity of points. 
2. The line, which is made up of points, has a particular measurement (just as many points                
as it is and nothing more) and so is limited. It is a definite number, and a definite number                   
is a finite or limited number. However, since the line is infinitely divisible, it is also                
12 ​Ibid. 
unlimited. Therefore, it's contradictory to suppose a line is composed of a multiplicity of              
points.  13
Speaking thus, then, the existence of plurality is rationally impossible. For, according to each of               
the above the paradox of the limited and unlimited can be seen. Rationally speaking, things, if                
not one but many, involve infinity by divisibility. However, they must of necessity be limited in                
order to be numbered as many. Thus, the phenomenal experience is proved to be rationally               
untenable. 
The Paradoxes of Motion 
The Dichotomy 
The first asserts the non-existence of motion on the ground that that which is in               
locomotion must arrive at the half-way stage before it arrives at the goal.  
14
Suppose a runner is standing at point A and must reach point B in order to finish the race. The                    
only way he can reach point B is by reaching the halfway point, say A​1, ​between A and B, before                    
reaching B. But then the only way he can reach halfway point A​1 is by reaching the halfway                  
point, say A​2​, between A and A​1​, and so on ​ad infinitum in order to finish the course. Thus in                    
order for the runner to reach point B, he will have to traverse an infinite number of points in a                    
finite time, which is impossible. Therefore, motion is absurd. 
Achilles and the Tortoise 
Suppose Achilles and a tortoise begin a race. Achilles allows the tortoise to have the head start                 
since he is confident that the slow tortoise will never win the race. But now in order for Achilles                   
to get past by the tortoise, he will first have to reach the point left behind by tortoise; but by that                     
time the tortoise would have already gone by farther from the point, and so on ​ad infinitum​. In                  
other words, if A​1 is the point where the tortoise is presently and Achilles has to reach this point                   
before he can overtake the tortoise, by the time Achilles would have got to point A​1 the tortoise                  
would have gone a bit away and be at point A​2 ​which would then become the next point which                   
Achilles would have to reach in order to overtake the tortoise, but by the time he gets to A​2 the                    
tortoise would have gone a bit more farther, and so on ​ad infinitum​. In this way, logically                 
Achilles can never overtake the tortoise. But empirically Achilles is seen to overtake the tortoise,               
and therein lies the paradox. Empirically Achilles overtakes the tortoise but logically he cannot.              
And since overtaking the tortoise is seen as logically absurd, it cannot be true. 
The Arrow 
Consider an apparently flying arrow, in any instant. At any given moment, the arrow occupies a                
particular position in space equal to its length. But for an arrow to occupy a position in space                  
equal to its length means that it is at rest. However, since the arrow must always occupy such a                   
13 “Zeno of Elea,” http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/z/zenoelea.htm 
14 Aristotle as cited in “Zeno’s Paradoxes,” http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/paradox-zeno/ 
position in space equal to its length, the arrow must be at rest at all moments. Moreover, since                  
space as quantity is infinitely divisible, the flying arrow occupies an infinite number of these               
positions of rest. But the sum of an infinite number of these positions of rest is not a motion.                   
Therefore, the arrow is never in motion. The absurd conclusion would then be that the flying                
arrow is ever at rest, which is impossible. Therefore, motion is false. 
Thus, the phenomenal world of empirical plurality is shown to be false. The main parts of the                 
arguments of Parmenides and Zeno are summarized as follows: 
1. Being cannot arise out of non-being, for then it would have to be even before it arises out                  
of non-being; therefore, being is eternal and ungenerated.  15
2. Being is indivisible, for it cannot divide itself from itself. 
3. Being is one and not many, for if it were many it would have to be diversely                 
differentiated by something other than being, namely non-being, which means to be            
differentiated by nothing. 
4. Being cannot be falsified; for if spoken of, it must be; if not spoken of, then nothing is                  
spoken of. If being is not, then nothing is. 
5. Being is indestructible, for change cannot be predicated of it, it being absolute. 
6. The phenomenon of plurality is absurd, for it involves the paradox of the limited and the                
unlimited in the one divisible unit.  
7. The phenomenon of change is absurd, for it involves completion of an infinite series in a                
finite time, as Zeno’s paradoxes show. 
Thus, reality is one, eternal, indestructible, immutable, and thus, absolute. 
Implications for Divine Existence 
Either of the following implications results from the supposition that being is eternal and              
singular: 
1. God is being and the only one reality; all plurality of selves is an illusion. 
2. God as an ontological distinct does not exist, for reality is one. 
3. God is not, only being is; if the individual definitions of ‘God’ and ‘being’ are to be                    
retained and not confused. 
However, though Parmenides and Zeno have attempted to solve the ontological problem of the              
nature of reality, they have left the cosmological problem of the same unanswered. If reality is                
one, what accounts for the plurality that is manifest; or why does or how did reality come to                  
appear as many? To this Parmenides and Zeno remain silent, and since a theory that doesn’t take                 
into consideration the whole avenue of the subject in question cannot be considered to be               
complete and unified, attention must be turned to the Indian philosophers to see whether they               
have a rational answer to this cosmological question. Nevertheless, this far the contradictions             
between reason and experience have been aptly demonstrated by the Grecians. And the             
15 Samuel Enoch Stumpf, ​Socrates to Sartre​, pp. 16, 17 
culmination of their rational search in the Eleatics was anticipated; for if reason alone is               
trustworthy, then experience must be dispensed with, as Zeno clearly showed. 
Critique 
Finally, as seen earlier, the rational search has been chiefly driven by the characteristics that               
define reason itself; hence, the results are seen to be of the nature of the same. As was seen                   
earlier, ​A priori ​or rational truths have at least five characteristics that distinguish them as               
rational truths; they are: unity, necessity, immutability, transcendence, and strict universality. In            
accordance, the rational search has revealed that reality is a unity (one); it necessarily exists               
(cannot be thought of not to exist), is immutable (motionless, changeless), transcendent (that is,              
this world being an illusion, reality cannot be this world), and finally strict universality meaning               
that reality is indivisible and contiguous to itself. Thus, the rational results have only been a                
mirror of reason itself.  
Now, attention must be turned to the rationalists among the Indian philosophers to see how they                
explain the unity and plurality of the universe.  
The ​Advaitin​ Search for Unity in Diversity 
Advaita philosophy is deeply religious and epistemologically based. The chief problem is            
ignorance and the way to ultimate liberation is by realization of Truth. ​Advaita ​means non-dual               
and refers to the doctrine that reality is ultimately non-dual in nature and all plurality and                
diversity manifest in nature is only illusory. Liberation consists in the dissolution of the              
knower-known duality. To quote from the Brhadaranyaka Upanishad: 
Because when there is duality, as it were, then one smells something, one sees              
something, one hears something, one speaks something, one thinks something, one           
knows something. (But) when to the knower of Brahman everything has become the             
Self, then what should one smell and through what, what should one see and through               
what, what should one hear and through what, what should one speak and through              
what, what should one think and through what, what should one know and through              
what? Through what should one know That owing to which all this is known – through                
what, O Maitreyi, should one know the Knower?  
16
The doctrine of ​advaita (non-dualism) has its origin in the Upanishads though the             
systematization of it was eventually done by Shankaracharya (788-820 A.D.), a Brahmin from             
Kerala and disciple of Gaudapada whose ​Karika ​(expository treatise) on the Mandukya            
Upanishad contains the roots of ​advaita siddhanta​ (doctrine of non-dualism). 
Of the many Upanishads that exist (over 108), the Mundakya Upanishad is considered to best               
embody the doctrine of non-dualism. In only twelve mantras, it is thought as have packed into a                 
nutshell all the wisdom of the Upanishads. Together with the Gaudapada Karika and             17
16 ​The Brhadaranyaka Upanisad​, II.iv.14 (trans. Swami Madhavananda; Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama, 1997), p. 259 
17 Swami Krishnananda,​ The Mandukya Upanishad​ (Rishikesh: The Divine Life Society, 1996), p. 7 
Shankara’s commentary on it, it forms a powerful argument for the inevitability of non-dual              
reality. In this research, the Mandukya Upanishad with Gaudapada’s Karika and Shankara’s            
commentary will be chiefly studied to find the rational epistemics inherent in their conception of               
reality as non-dual. 
While for the Greeks physical reality was a major concern, for the Indians conscious reality was                
the major concern. While the Greeks tried to find what the unifying basis of all physical reality                 
was as such, the Indians wanted to find what the unifying basis of all conscious reality was as                  
such. The Greeks began from physics and proceeded on to metaphysics. The Indians began from               
the self, from consciousness, and proceeded on to metaphysics. The Greeks tried to analyze the               
known in order to understand the known. The Indian analyzed the knower in order to understand                
the known. Thus, the Indian quest for ultimate reality can be described as a search for a                 
psychological basis of the universe. 
This has several implications: 
1. In the search for the external, one begins with the attempt to first understand the internal,                
viz. consciousness. 
2. Before knowing what is out there, one begins with the attempt to first understand why               
knowing even exists. 
3. If consciousness as one experiences it is false, then all quest no matter how scientific it                
appears will be wrong headed. But if consciousness as one experiences it is true, then the                
quest can end up in truth. 
4. The problem is not why something exists, but why something such as consciousness             
exists. The knower is thus the starting point. 
5. Liberation, thus, becomes noetic; knowledge of the Truth brings salvation. 
6. No wonder, then, in advaita the Brahman is called Sat-chit-ananda, meaning           
Being-Consciousness-Bliss, with pure consciousness as the essence of being and bliss;           
bliss being that condition of being as consciousness in which no distraction or strife by                  
virtue of duality exists. 
The words “Brahman,” “Self,” “Reality,” “Lord,” “God,” and “Consciousness,” in the personal            
noun form refer to the Absolute and Ultimate Reality, Brahman. Following, then, is a brief               
exposition of the rational method employed in the search for reality as contained in the               
Mandukya Upanishad , and Gaudapada’s Karika and Shankara’s Commentary on it: 18
Argument from Dream 
1. Objects perceived in a dream are false since they cannot be located in finite body (II.1,                
2). 
2. Objects perceived in the dream and the waking states, being common in the sense of both                
being perceived, are similar and, therefore, one (II.4, 5). 
18 ​Mandukya Upanishad, with the Karika of Gaudapada and the Commentary of Sankaracarya​ (trans. Swami 
Gambhirananda; Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama, 1995). 
3. Therefore, objects perceived in the waking states are as false as objects perceived ​in the                
dream state. 
This argument is reminiscent of the old Chinese philosopher’s question: If I dreamed I was a                
butterfly and awoke to find myself a man, how do I know whether I was a man who dreamed I                    
was a butterfly or was a butterfly dreaming I am a man? The above argument of Gaudapada may                  
be reinstated in the following manner: 
1. Since consciousness is one, its perception must be consistent. 
2. To say that objects in dream are false but objects in the waking state are real is to say that                    
consciousness is inconsistent in perceiving things. 
3. But if consciousness is inconsistent, then truth cannot be known for certain. 
4. Since the objects in dream are obviously false from the standpoint of the waking state, it                
must be inferred that the objects in the waking state are false from another standpoint,               
and so on, in order that consistency of consciousness be maintained. 
5. The standpoints cannot be infinite; therefore a final condition of consciousness must            
exist. 
6. In the final analysis, it must, for the sake of consistency, be maintained that the objects of                 
both the dream and waking states are false. 
7. Therefore, the objects of both the dream and waking states are false and phenom​enal              
plurality as it appears is unreal.  
The dream and waking states point to subjective idealism. Though the objects of the dream and                
waking states can be denied reality, reality cannot be denied to consciousness itself. Thus,              
consciousness itself is the substratum to the objects of perception. And consciousness is             
non-different from the experiencer as Shankara explains: 
The creatures visible to a waking man are non-different from his consciousness, since             
they are perceived through consciousness, just like the creatures perceived by the            
consciousness of a dreamer. And that consciousness, again, engaged in the perception            
of creatures, is non-different from the experiencer, since it is perceived by the             
experiencer, like the consciousness in the dream state.  
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Thus, Consciousness alone is the only reality and plurality of objects is super-imposed on it. 
Gaudapada’s dismissal of the phenomenal reality of waking state on the basis of his dismissal of                
the phenomenal reality of the dream state might be unjustified extrapolation, in the sense of               
certainty of knowledge. For by his argument only a probability emerges: this phenomenal reality              
of the waking state ​might probably be ​as unreal from another state of consciousness as the                
phenomenal reality of the dream state is unreal to the waking state. But how does one know                 
whether or not the waking state is the rock-bottom state of consciousness? On what basis is                
another higher state of consciousness assumed? Gaudapada doesn’t give a clear answer,            
19 Comment on Karika IV. 65-66, ​Mandukya Upanisad,​ p. 209 
demonstrating the hypothesis-drive of his reasoning. Faith seems to form a strong basis for the               
rationality of Gaudapada. 
Argument from Immortality of Soul (III. 19-22; IV. 7-10) 
This is an argument directed at those believers in rebirth who vouch for the immortality of the                 
soul. It demonstrates that if the soul is immortal it cannot undergo mortality. 
1. A thing can never change in its nature (as fire cannot change its heat). 
2. The soul is immortal by nature. 
3. Therefore, the soul can never become mortal, i.e., it can never pass into birth. 
By the word ‘nature’ Gaudapada means ‘that which is permanently acquired (​samsiddiki​), or is              
intrinsic (​svabhaviki​), instinctive (​sahaja​), non-produced (​akrita​), or unchanging in character          
(​svabhavam na jahati ya​).’ With this definition in view, he writes: “All souls are intrinsically               20
(​svabhavatah, by nature) free from old age and death.” Consequently, saying that a soul              21
becomes mortal by birth is to say that the soul becomes the opposite of itself in nature by birth,                   
which is a contradiction in terms, seeing that the soul was first called immortal by nature and                 
nature was defined as that which is ​permanently acquired. Therefore, if the soul is immortal it                
cannot become mortal in anyway. Thus, those who believe in the immortality of soul cannot               
rationally also sustain the theory that the phenomenon of birth and death is true. Hence,               
phenomenal events cannot be true. 
Thus, this argument is meant to demonstrate that the phenomenon of birth and its accompanying               
doctrine of rebirth are rationally inconsistent with the doctrine of the immortality of soul. With               
reference to the doctrine of rebirth and creation, Gaudapada says: ‘Instruction about creation has              
been imparted by the wise for the sake of those who, from the facts of experience and adequate                  
behaviour, vouch for the existence of substantiality, and who are ever afraid of the birthless               
entity.’  22
Contrary to the supposition that souls become mortal at birth, which forms the core of the                
doctrine that Gaudapada attacks, there is also the belief that the soul never becomes mortal at                
birth; rather it is embodied at birth and gives up the body at death. Thus, the birth or mortality of                    
body doesn’t affect the soul. In that case, the phenomenon of birth and decay cannot be                23
dismissed. However, this belief presently doesn’t seem to be the concern of Gaudapada. 
Argument from Coming to Being (IV. 4) 
1. A thing that already exists does not pass into birth (for it already is). 
2. A thing that does not pre-exist cannot pass into birth (for something cannot come out of                
nothing). 
20 IV. 9, ​Ibid,​ p. 162 
21 IV. 10, ​Ibid,​ p. 163 
22 IV. 41, ​Ibid​, p. 192; the statement has overtones also of the permissiveness of myth for the common folk. 
23 ​Srimad Bhagvad-Gita ​II. 20-23 (tr. Swami Vireswarananda; Madras: Sri Ramakrishna Math, 1974), pp. 38, 39 
3. Therefore​, there is no birth. 
This argument, similar to Parmenides’ argument from coming-into-being, has in perspective not            
just the material universe but also being as consciousness and arrives at the conclusion by               
negation of two opposing views held by two different schools Indian philosophy, ​viz. the              
Sankhya and the Nyaya. 
The Sankhya held that ‘something cannot come out of nothing; and whatever is, has always               
been.’ Birth is the manifestation of what is already in a latent form. Objects do not come to be;                   24
they already are. The Nyaya, on the other hand, held to the doctrine of non-existent effect, which                 
taught that the effect, once non-existent, comes into being afterwards. In other words, something              
comes out of nothing.  25
Gaudapada negates both the views by stating that neither the pre-existent nor the non-existent              
can pass into birth. However, since birth of objects is perceived empirically, phenomenal             
experience must be false. Thus, both the Sankhya and Nyaya by opposing each other in their                
views prove that non-dualism is true. 
Argument from Disintegration (IV. 11) 
1. The only way the cause can take birth is by (at least partial) disintegration of itself. 
2. But nothing that disintegrates can be eternal. 
3. Therefore, if the cause disintegrates, then it cannot be eternal. 
4. But the cause is eternal. 
5. Therefore​, it cannot disintegrate; i.e., it does not take birth. 
This argument is based on the empirical notion that whatever disintegrates cannot be eternal. For               
instance, a jar that is disintegrable is not eternal. For it will soon be reduced to nothing by                  
disintegration. Or it at least has the potential to disintegrate, which implies that it is not eternal                 
necessarily, or in the absolute sense. Therefore, if the cause were to be eternal it must not                 
disintegrate. Thus, the doctrine of birth is nullified. 
Together with the argument from coming to being, this argument is a strong case for               
non-dualism. If something cannot come out of nothing, then something must be eternal. If this               
something is eternal then the phenomenal world is unreal; for eternality evinces birthlessness and              
non-disintegration. Since the cause must be eternal, therefore the phenomenal world is unreal. 
However, the argument loses if it is proven that this eternal cause can create a contingent world                 
out of nothing. But this is rationally difficult since reason lacks any synthetic (empirically              
demonstrable) way by which it can be proven that something can be created by someone out of                 
nothing. The only cases where such creation out of thin air is seen are in magic or the conjurer’s                   
24 M. Hiriyanna, ​Indian Philosophy​, p. 273 
25 ​Ibid​, p. 239 
trick. But the result of such creation is illusory and unreal and proof of the doctrine of                 
non-dualism which states that phenomenon is illusory or unreal. 
On the final analysis, everything can be doubted but consciousness cannot be doubted. And if               
consciousness exists, it must be eternal; for it cannot come into existence either by itself or by                 
something else. Further on, since the soul is birthless, reincarnation and birth is false. External               
objects share in similarity with internal objects of dream and therefore do not exist; thus, the                
phenomenal world is unreal from the standpoint of ultimate reality even as the dream world is                
unreal from the standpoint of phenomenal reality. If the phenomenal world were true then, there               
could be nothing eternal and cessation of the world would have occurred already as is written: “It                 
is beyond question that the phenomenal world (​prapancah​) would cease to be if it had any                
existence…” (I. 18). Obviously, since temporality and transitoriness is characteristic of the world             
in which birth and death of things is the only empirical fact. As such, then, there could be                  
nothing eternal. But perhaps it may be said that phenomenal reality is created by a transcendent                
absolute reality in the sense that both are equally real. 
But phenomenal reality cannot be causally related to absolute reality: If the cause is birthless               
then the effect must be birthless which is contradictory; if cause and effect are simultaneous then                
causal relation does not exist meaning the cause did not cause the effect, which is contradictory;                
if the effect and cause are mutually causative then, the father-son contradiction results. Thus,              
phenomenal reality cannot be the product of an uncaused cause. If it is not the product of                 
creation then, of course, implicitly, all change, motion, and birth lacks an ultimate causal              
relation. Therefore, the phenomenal world has no real existence. Thus, from the absolute             
standpoint, only Consciousness or the Self is Reality. 
Everything seems to be born because of the empirical outlook; therefore there is             
nothing that is eternal. From the standpoint of Reality, everything is the birthless Self;              
therefore there is no such thing as annihilation.  
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Thus, only “Consciousness – birthless, motionless and non-material, as well as tranquil and             
non-dual” exists. In the final analysis, by the way, both birth and birthlessness are categories               27
that cannot be applied to Ultimate Reality (IV. 60, 74). However, if consciousness is non-dual,               
and phenomenal reality is unreal, then what accounts for the experience of duality or plurality in                
the world? To this the following explanation is given: 
Analogy of the Firebrand 
1. As the firebrand appears to be straight or crooked when in movement, so does              
Consciousness  appear to be the knower and the known when in vibration (IV. 47). 28
2. As the firebrand, when not in motion, becomes free from appearances and birth, so              
Consciousness, when not in vibration, will be free from appearances and birth (IV. 48). 
26 Karika IV. 57,​ Mandukya Upanisad​, p. 204 
27 Karika IV. 45, ​Mandukya Upanisad​, p. 195 
28 The word ‘Consciousness’ with capital ‘C’ here refers to Brahman, the Absolute Reality. 
3. The appearances of the firebrand in motion are not externally caused. Neither do they              
come from anywhere else nor do they go anywhere else from it (since appearances are               
not things and so lack substantiality); likewise, when Consciousness is in vibration, the             
appearances do not come to It from anywhere else, nor do they go anywhere else from It                 
when It is at rest. Appearances lack substantiality and therefore are unreal (IV. 49-52). 
4. In this way the external entities (appearances) are not the products of Consciousness;             
neither is Consciousness a product of external entities. Thus, the knowers confirm the             
non-existence of cause and effect (IV. 54). Consciousness is, thus, objectless and            
eternally without relations (IV. 72). 
5. As in dream Consciousness vibrates as though having dual functions, so in the w​aking              
state Consciousness vibrates as though with two facets as subject and object (IV. 61, 62). 
The firebrand, thus, in its vibrant condition illustrates how qualitative, quantitative, and relational             
appearances occur when Consciousness is in motion. However, the illustration does not answer             
as to what accounts for Consciousness to be in motion, to which the following answer is given: 
The Hypothesis of Maya 
Even as objects appear to be real by magic, so do objects appear to be real through ​Maya ​(IV. 58,                    
59). 
1. In the same manner that magic is not an object that exists; Maya also is not an object that                   
exists (IV. 58, 59). 
2. As a creature conjured up by magic (Yatha mayamayo jeevo) undergoes birth and death,              
so also do all creatures appear and disappear (IV. 69). 
3. The birthless Self becomes differentiated verily through Maya, and it does so in no other               
way than this. For should It become multiple in reality, the immortal will undergo              
mortality (III. 19). That is, the contradiction of “immortal is mortal” (A≠A) occurs. 
4. The imagination that a plurality of objects exists is the Maya (delusion) of the Self by                
which it itself is deluded (II. 19). 
5. Maya is not a reality in the sense that it exists separately of Brahman, but is only                 
descriptive of the condition of self-delusion that Brahman experiences (IV. 58). If Maya             
were existent then non-duality would be false since the second is already imagined. If it               
were non-existent then the experience of duality could not be explained. Consequently,            
neither existence nor non-existence can be predicated of it. Attempts to call it as existent               
produces the error similar to calling delusion as a power that exists in the condition “the                
man is deluded.” Accordingly, the phrase “by the power of Its own Maya” (II. 12) may                
be re-phrased as “by​ self-delusion”. 
Thus, vibration of Consciousness gives rise to the experience of diversity, which is ​Maya or               
delusion. In other words, the whole condition of vibration and phenomenal experience is ​Maya​.              
The implications are clear: if the Self or Brahman can be self-deluded then It cannot be perfect.                 
As O. N. Krishnan says, “If He is subject to delusion, then He cannot be considered omniscient                 
and omnipotent.” However, omniscience and omnipotence are attributes that are inapplicable to            29
the non-dual Self. Therefore, it is wrong to talk of the Self as lacking or possessing any such                  
attributes. As Shankara puts it: 
…the Self, in Its own reality, is not an object of any other means of knowledge; for the                  
Self is free from all adventitious attributes. Nor…does It belong to any class; because,              
by virtue of Its being one without a second, It is free from generic and specific                
attributes…. It is devoid of all action. Nor is It possessed of qualities like blueness etc.,                
It being free from qualities. Therefore It baffles all verbal description.  
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Another point which O. N. Krishnan makes against the ​Maya ​theory is that since Brahman by                
being deluded is the source of all evil in the world, while at the same time the law of ​Karma                    
operates to administer justice in the world, how can it be logically conceived that the same                
deluded Brahman is the source of evils and injustices and at the same time dispenser of justice?                 31
To which it may be replied that both ​Karma ​and rebirth are unreal from the standpoint of                 
Ultimate Reality. In other words, they appear to be so only by ​Maya​; as Gaudapada says: “Birth                 
of a thing that (already) exists can reasonably be possible only through Maya and not in reality.”                
Ultimately, if all is non-dual, what is that causes evil to what and what is that judges what?                   32
Further, being free of relational attributes such as “justice,” “goodness,” etc. do not apply to               
Brahman. 
The process of ​Maya ​is described by the Karika as follows:  33
1. First the Lord (Brahman) imagines the individual (soul). 
2. Then He imagines the different objects, external and mental. 
3. The individual gets his memory in accordance with the kind of thought-impressions he             
has. 
4. The Self is, consequently, imagined to be the many. 
5. This is the Maya of that self-effulgent One, by which He Himself is deluded. 
Regarding the relation of the individual souls with the Absolute Brahman, the following             
explanation drawn from an analogy of jars and space is given: 
The Analogy of Jars and Space (III. 3-8) 
1. Just as space confined within the jars etc. merge completely on the disintegration of he               
jars etc., so do the individual souls merge here in the Self (III. 4). 
2. Just as all the spaces confined within the various jars are not darkened when one of the                 
spaces thus confined becomes contaminated by dust, smoke, etc., so also is the case with               
all the individuals in the matter of being affected by happiness etc. (III. 6). 
29 O. N. Krishnan, ​In Search of Reality, ​p. 343 
30 ​Mandukya Upanisad​, p. 32 
31 O. N. Krishnan, ​In Search of Reality, ​p. 343 
32 III. 27, ​Mandukya Upanisad​, p. 134 
33 II. 16-19, ​Mandukya Upanisad,​ pp. 74-77 
3. As the space within a jar is neither a transformation nor a part of space (as such), so an                   
individual being is never a transformation nor a part of the supreme Self (III. 7). 
4. Just as the sky becomes blackened by dust etc. to the ignorant, so also the Self becomes                 
tarnished by impurities to the unwise (III. 8). 
5. The aggregates (of bodies and senses) are all projected like dream by the Maya of the                
Self (atma-maya-visarjitah, i.e., Self’s deluded-projection). Be it a question of superiority           
or equality of all, there is no logical​ ground to prove their existence (III. 10). 
In accordance with (3) above, it is erroneous to suppose that an individual being is a                
transformation of the Self. For if that was true, then when an individual realized Brahman,               
cosmic liberation would have simultaneously occurred. Similarly, it is erroneous to suppose that             
the individual is a part of the Brahman, as if Brahman were a divisible whole. For if Brahman                  
were divisible, then in accordance to the argument from disintegration it would not be eternal.               
However, if it were not eternal, then it could not be, in accordance to the argument from                 
coming-into-being. Thus, Brahman is the eternal, unchanging, formless, partless, birthless,          
sleepless, dreamless, tranquil and fearless, non-dual Self (III. 36, 37). 
Critique of Non-Dualism and the Theory of Maya 
The rational mirror has been clean over ​advaita​. Consequently, the five characteristics of             
rationality, ​viz. unity, necessity, immutability, transcendence, and strict universality are readily           
reflected in the concept of Brahman. Brahman is non-dual (unity), Real (necessity),            
unchangeable and birthless (immutability), non-phenomenal (transcendence), and all-pervasive        34
(strict universality). 
Obviously, the non-dualistic enterprise, though thoroughly rational, is not freed from a ​kind of              
fideism​. This is so in the sense that the non-dualistic enterprise itself begins from the hypothesis                
that all reality is one, Being is one. Logically, then, when the cosmological argument is applied                
to it, this Being turns out to be the uncaused one. The argument from necessity and contingency                 
necessitates Being to be necessary. Similarly, other arguments prove that this Being is             
immutable, undividable, and infinite. Thus, the hypothesis that all Being is one facilitates reason              
towards this conclusion of non-dualism. However, it is also inevitable that reason assumes this              
worldly reality to be the only reality and, thus all being to be one. On what basis, could it assume                    
some other kind of existence to which these rational attributes could be applied? Experience, of               
course, doesn’t provide it with any such ideas. And, apart from Revelation, reason is certainly               
driven upon this hypothesis, ​viz., that this worldly reality is all reality available for analysis,               
towards non-dualism. But immediately the problem to explain away phenomenal reality, the            
plural and dynamic one, as false emerges and non-dualists come up with the hypothesis of ​Maya                
to ward off this problem. 
However, the theory of ​Maya does bear some difficulties. If ​Maya ​is nothing other than the                
deluded condition of the Self then, as to how Consciousness gets vibrant is not explained. If                
Maya ​is intrinsic to the nature of the Self, then the Self cannot be attributeless; further, since                 
34 Karika I. 10, ​Mandukya Upanisad, ​p. 40 
delusive power is intrinsic to It, truth can never be a sure possibility. Besides, since the                
individuals are neither transformations nor parts of the Self, the Self is untouched by what               
happens to the individuals, which are but dream-like from the absolute standpoint. Then, how              
can it be said that the delusion occurs to the Self if bondage or liberation of the individual does                   
not affect It in anyway? 
Moreover, the vibration of ​Maya theory does not make it clear how and why self-delusion results                
in plurality of appearances. Dream objects though unreal have similarity with objects of the              
waking state, thus admittedly arisen from the experience of the waking state (IV. 37). But objects                
of the waking state cannot be so related to the other states of consciousness. For in both ​Prajna                  
and ​Turiya these objects cease to be. In the analogy of the rope and snake, wherein the rope is                   
falsely perceived as a snake in the dark, past experience with snake may account for the illusion;                 
however, in the experience of plurality how can non-duality account for the same? 
Furthermore, the Karika’s assertion that ​Maya ​has no reality (IV.58) does pose problem. For if               
Maya ​has no reality then how can it have a delusive influence over the Self? But then, on the                   
other hand, non-dualism does have a problem in its opposite, for if ​Maya ​did have any reality                 
then, non-dualism would cease in face of the dualism of Self and ​Maya​. To avoid this                
contradiction, ​Maya ​is said to be non-existing, which only means that it does not exist. In that                 35
case, the rational conclusion must be that it, as being nothing, can affect nothing on the Self. It                  
cannot even be said that ‘self-delusion’ is non-existent and still mean that ​Maya is operative.               
Obviously, reason has come to a standpoint, even in ​Advaita ​philosophy where it fails to               
reconcile reason and experience. Thus, the question of what accounts for phenomenal experience             
is not satisfactorily answered. And so, it may be said that though the rationalist attempt had been                 
successful in deducing the non-duality, transcendence, immutability, necessity, and infinity of           
the Absolute, it has not been successful in providing a theory that accounts for the experience of                 
plurality in the universe. Thus, the rationalist attempt fails to harmonize itself with experience. 
In both the Grecian and the ​advaitin search, it has been observed that the resultant theology has                 
been a reflection of the characteristics of reason. The culmination of the rational search has been                
monism or non-dualism. The result was inevitable from the deductions reached in the reasoning              
process. Proceeding from certain assumptions and having arrived at certain conclusions by            
reasoning, the derivation of a monistic outlook was only a necessary outcome. The most              
important of the findings in the rational path to monism were: 
1. The logical impossibility of something coming out of nothing. Lacking any empirical            
concept of something coming out of nothing, it only becomes inevitable to assume that              
something cannot come out of nothing. Further, something coming out of nothing in the              
sense of self-generation is logically absurd. 
2. The logical impossibility of change, either in relation to space or time. Consequently,             
motion, birth, and transformation are absurd. 
3. Uncertainty of phenomenal reality from analysis of the states of consciousness. 
35 Karika IV. 58, ​Mandukya Upanisad, ​p. 205 
4. Infinite conceptual divisibility leads to the paradoxical deduction that objects are            
essentially both finite and infinite. From our point of view, they appear finite but by               
virtue of being infinitely divisible, they are infinite within themselves. 
5. The phenomenon of disintegration is not in keeping with the rational necessity of the              
universe being eternal (since it cannot come out of nothing). If it is eternal, then it cannot                     
disintegrate. Thus, the phenomenal world cannot be true. 
In the final analysis, it is necessity, eternality, and immutability necessitated of reality and the               
conviction that all being is one and indivisible that leads to the conclusion that reality is non-dual                 
and contiguous (universal). 
The next section in this chapter studies the epistemological theory of Immanuel Kant (A.D.              
1724-1804) in order to analyze his thought regarding the epistemic difficulties and problems             
involved in any attempt to unravel the mystery of Ultimate Reality. 
Kantian Epistemics and Divine Reality 
Immanuel Kant’s (1724-1804) theory of knowledge is often referred to as the Copernican             
revolution in knowledge. According to Kant himself, as Copernicus hypothesized that the earth             
revolved around the sun rather than the sun revolving around the earth in order to solve the                 
discrepancies in astronomy, it is also proper to hypothesize that objects conform to the faculty of                
intuition rather than the faculty of intuition conforming to the objects. Though Kant insists that               36
all knowledge begins with experience, he must be regarded as a rationalist and not an empiricist                
since he claims the mind to be actively involved in the production of ideas based on some innate                  
ideas it already has in possession. The resultant knowledge of the world that one has is nothing                 
but the product of the mind, which arbitrarily decides what the sensations must look like. Thus,                
knowledge is primarily rational (it resembles the mental structure). 
Kant’s ​The Critique of Pure Reason (1781) has two main divisions: the Transcendental             
Aesthetic, the Transcendental Logic. Transcendental Logic is further divided into Transcendental           
Analytic and Transcendental Dialectic. Both transcendental aesthetic and transcendental logic          
are the subjects of transcendental philosophy which Kant defines as the study of inherent              
structure of the mind, or the innate laws of thought. It is a philosophy of the purely and merely                   37
speculative reason. 
Kant defines ‘transcendental aesthetic’ as the science of all principles of ​a priori sensibility.              38
The science of transcendental aesthetic shows that there are two pure forms of sensible intuition,               
serving as principles of ​a priori knowledge, namely, space and time. Space and time are not                39
objective but subjective conditions for the apprehension of all things. In other words, all things               
are conceived as being in space and time and nothing can be conceived as being apart from them.                  
36 Immanuel Kant, ​The Critique of Pure Reason​ (trans. Norman Kemp Smith; 
http://www.hkbu.edu.hk/~ppp/cpr/toc.html, 1985), p. 22 
37 Will Durant, ​The Story of Philosophy​, p. 267 
38 ​The Critique of Pure Reason,​ p. 66 
39 ​Ibid​, p. 67 
One can conceive the gradual disintegration and vanishing of a thing in space but cannot               
conceive the vanishing of space itself. Thus, transcendental aesthetic shows the ​a priori             
existence of space and time as the pure forms of intuition. Furthermore, transcendental aesthetic              
cannot contain more than these two elements, namely space and time. It is the ​a priori                40
subjectivity of these forms of intuition that make possible the definite outworking of arithmetic              
and geometry; so that it is not necessary for one to go and experiment in all parts of the universe                    
in order to establish the rules of geometry. The forms of intuition, ​viz. ​space and time, provide                 
the framework with reference to which universally applicable geometrical rules can be drawn. 
In his section on transcendental analytic, Kant lists twelve ​a priori ​categories or pure concepts of                
understanding in accordance to which reality is known. The understanding applies the pure             
concepts or categories to all influx of data and arranges them in order so as to facilitate                 
knowledge. Consequentially, ‘Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts          
are blind.’ And further on, ‘The understanding can intuit nothing, the senses can think nothing.               41
Only through their union can knowledge arise.’ The categories are: ​of quantity​: unity, plurality,              42
totality; ​of quality: reality, negation, limitation; ​of relation​: ​of inherence and subsistence, of              
causality and dependence, of community (reciprocity between agent and patient); and ​of            
modality​: possibility - impossibility, existence - non-existence, necessity – contingency.  43
Kant argues that one cannot know reality as it is or a thing-in-itself; what can be known is only                   
thing-as-it-appears-to-us. The thing-in-itself is what Kant calls ​noumenal ​reality; while the world            
as we experience it is termed ​phenomenal ​reality. Since reality as it is cannot be known                
Kantianism becomes another form of moderate epistemic agnosticism. What is known to us             
including the space and time that we experience is nothing but the creation of the mind in active                  
participation with the influx of sensations that it unifies and synthesizes in accordance to the               
categories of thought in the framework of time and space. 
Proceeding from here Kant attempts to explain the cause of metaphysical paradoxes in his              
section on transcendental dialectic. The metaphysical problem of psychology, cosmology, and           
theology arises mainly from a confusion of the categories of thought and forms of intuition with                
reality and the attempt to transcend the horizons of the understanding demarcated by the ​a priori                
forms and concepts. This misapplying of speculative reason beyond the bounds of possible             
experience lands one in antinomies of pure reason which are mutually contradictory ideas of              
metaphysics. 
The antinomies are divided into classes of thesis and antithesis. While the thesis states one               
transcendental idea, the antithesis states its opposite transcendental idea which surmounts to an             
antinomy. The first antinomy is of space and time. The thesis is that ‘the world has a beginning                  
in time, and is also limited as regards space.’ This thesis is a rationally anticipated one since a                  
beginningless world would imply the completion of an infinite succession of moments in the past               
before reaching the present, which is a sheer impossibility.  44
40 ​Ibid,​ pp. 81, 82 
41 ​Ibid,​ p. 93 
42 ​Ibid,​ p. 93 
43 ​Ibid,​ p. 113 
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On the other hand, the antithesis “the world has no beginning, and no limits in space; it is infinite                   
as both regards space and time” is also not without rational proof. For if the world had a                  
beginning, it could only have that beginning in time, preceding which a moment of time and so                 
on several succession of moments ​ad infinitum exist. Secondly, to treat space as a limited               
container would assume the existence of another space in which this container exists and so on                
ad infinitum​. Therefore, space and time cannot be finite but are infinite. This antinomy is                45
solved once one realizes that both space and time have no absolute reality beyond us. Space is                 
‘no object but only the form of possible objects, it cannot be regarded as something absolute in                 
itself that determines the existence of things.’  46
The thesis of the second antinomy of atomism states that ‘Every composite substance in the               
world is made up of simple parts, and nothing anywhere exists save the simple or what is                 
composed of the simple.’ If substance were not made up of simple parts then in the final                 47
analysis nothing would remain; that is to say that there would not even be any substance. For in                  
order that the substance have definite existence, it should ultimately be made up of parts that                
cannot further be broken down. However, the antithesis states that ‘No composite thing in the               
world is made up of simple parts, and there nowhere exists in the world anything simple.’ For                 48
the space that a substance or its so called simple parts occupies is not made up of simple                  
constituents but of spaces, and anything that occupies space is, in concept, infinitely divisible;              
therefore, there nowhere exists in the world anything simple. This antinomy again is the result               49
of attributing external reality to space. 
The third antinomy, of freedom, states its thesis as ‘Causality in accordance with laws of nature                
is not the only causality from which the appearances of the world can one and all be derived. To                   
explain these appearances it is necessary to assume that there is also another causality, that of                
freedom.’ An infinite series of cause and effect would be the alternative for a world without                50
freedom. But an infinite series cannot land one in the present. There an uncaused factor, ​viz.                
freedom, must be conceded in order to explain the cosmos. However, the antithesis states that               
‘There is no freedom; everything in the world takes place solely in accordance with laws of                
nature.’ For causality is anticipated as the reason behind every event in the world. It is a law of                   
nature. And all nature is subject to this law. The only way transcendental power of freedom can                 
be had is by being outside the cosmos. It is never permissible to attribute such power to                 
substances in the world itself.  51
The fourth antinomy is of God. According to the thesis, ‘There belongs to the world, either as its                  
part or as its cause, a being that is absolutely necessary.’ Since the phenomenal world contains                52
a series of changes and every change is a necessary effect of a cause which itself is a necessary                   
effect of another cause and so on, it follows that something that is absolutely necessary must                
exist if change exists as its consequence. And this necessary thing cannot be apart from this                
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world but either part of it or cause of it. For it can only effect in time and not beyond time, and                      
since time belongs to the world of sense, the phenomenal world, this absolute necessary cause               
belongs to the world of sense. On the other hand, the antithesis states that ‘An absolutely                
necessary being nowhere exists in the world, nor does it exist outside the world as its cause.’                 
This is inevitable since the concept of an uncaused cause is contrary to the dynamical law of the                  
determination of all phenomena in time. Further, it can also not be said that the series itself is                  
absolutely necessary and unconditioned though contingent and conditioned in its parts; for the             
whole cannot be necessary if its parts are contingent. However, if it were supposed that the                
uncaused cause was apart of the world, even then it is assumed that in causing the effect it begins                   
to act, thus belonging to time and the sum total of phenomena, that is the world. Therefore, an                  
absolutely necessary being nowhere exists in the world, nor does it exist outside the world as its                 
cause. This antinomy is also caused by a confusion of the forms of intuition and the categories of                  
thought with reality. Neither space and time nor causality and community exist absolutely             
external to the knower but only as subjective constituents of the mind. Any attempt to transcend                
the bounds of the mind leads to antinomies as specified above. 
Implications for Divine Epistemics 
Kant resolutely argues that the traditional arguments for the existence of God, ​viz. the              
ontological, the cosmological, and the physico-theological (teleological) arguments are based on           
false premises. They proceed from the false assumption that quantity, quality, relation, and             
modality are inherent in the universe and not merely subjective to the knower alone. The               
arguments against the arguments for the existence of God are as follows: 
a. The Ontological Argument​: ​The ontological argument of St. Anselm (1033-1109) proceeded            
from the assumption that God was ‘that than which a greater cannot be conceived.’ However, if                
this God did not exist then everything conceived of would be greater than the conception of God                 
for reality is greater than an idea. Therefore, God as ‘that than which a greater cannot be                 
conceived’ must of necessity exist. Rene Descartes had his own form of the ontological              
argument in which he argued that since God is by definition the supremely perfect being, He                
cannot lack existence, for that would mean that He was not a supremely perfect being; and since                 
existence is a necessary attribute of perfection, God exists necessarily.  53
Kant argues that though the inference from contingent existence to necessary existence is correct               
and unavoidable, the conditions of the understanding refuse to aid us in forming any conception               
of such a being. Thus, the ontological argument is correct as far as words are concerned; but                 54
when it comes to actually forming a concept of the absolute and necessary being the argument                
fails. Further, the argument rests on judgments alone and cannot thereby alone establish the              
reality of anything. In Kant’s own words: ‘the unconditioned necessity of judgments is not the               
same as an absolute necessity of things.’ Alluding to Descartes’ analogy of the triangle Kant               55 56
writes that though to posit a triangle and yet reject its three angles would be self-contradictory,                
there is no contradiction in rejecting the triangle with its three angles together. To put it the other                  
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way, if suppose in the analytical statement, ‘all bachelors are unmarried men’ the subject              
‘bachelors’ implied the predicate ‘unmarried men,’ it still does not conclusively prove that there              
really are unmarried men or bachelors in the world. The statement is just a verbal one and is not                   
corroborated by empirical evidence. In the same manner, though the subject ‘the supremely             
perfect being’ implies the predicate ‘has existence as an attribute,’ yet it does not conclusively               
prove that there really is a supremely perfect being in accordance to the words. One can reject                 57
both the subject and predicate and still commit no contradiction. In addition, all existential              
propositions (that declare the existence or non-existence of the subject) are synthetic and not              
analytic and, therefore, the rejection of the predicated would never be a contradiction: ‘all              58
bachelors are unmarried men’ is not the same as ‘all bachelors exist.’ On the other hand if                 
existence was to be considered as an attribute of anything, it is clear that this could not be true                   
since an attribute adds to something and thus modifies it, but to say that something ​is ​does not                  
really add anything to it. ‘The small word “is” adds no new predicate, but only serves to posit the                   
predicate ​in its relation to the subject.’ Therefore, existence cannot be an attribute. Even               59
grammatically, it is understood that the words ‘is’ and ‘exists’ are not adjectives but verbs.  
However, even more difficult is the attribution of existence to an idea having ​a priori ​and not ​a                  
posteriori ​status. Kant says: 
Whatever, therefore, and however much, our concept of an object may contain, we             
must go outside it, if we are to ascribe existence to the object. In the case of objects of                   
the senses, this takes place through their connection with some one of our perceptions,              
in accordance with empirical laws. But in dealing with objects of pure thought, we              
have no means whatsoever of knowing their existence, since it would have to be              
known in a completely ​a priori manner. Our consciousness of all existence (whether             
immediately through perception, or mediately through inferences which connect         
something with perception) belongs exclusively to the unity of experience;          
any[alleged] existence outside this field, while not indeed such as we can declare to be               
absolutely impossible, is of the nature of an assumption which we can never be in a                
position to justify.  
60
Thus, since the idea of God as a perfect being cannot be empirically justified, it is impossible to                  
certify whether such a perfect being exists or not in reality. Here it may seem that Kant is leaning                   
towards empiricism, but it must be noted that he is only saying that necessity and strict                
universality can only be applied to that which is ​a priori ​and, thus, to the forms of intuition and                   
the categories of thought alone. To extend these to anything beyond these is to go beyond                
justification. One can be sure that the statement ‘every cause has an effect’ is true since causality                 
itself is a category of the mind and cannot be thought off. However, the same cannot be said of                   
the existence God or any other being in the world. The distinction between the ​a priori                
constituents of the mind and the ​a posteriori world of senses once understood, the ontological               
argument cannot stand any longer. Thus, the ontological argument is dismissed. 
b. The Cosmological Argument: ​As stated by Kant himself the cosmological argument runs as              
follows: If anything exists, an absolutely necessary being must also exist. Now I, at least, exist.                
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Therefore, an absolutely necessary being exists. Since an infinite series of contingent causal             61
relations is impossible an uncaused, unconditioned, necessary cause must be posited as the cause              
of the universe. However, Kant reasons that this argument too, as the former one, attempts to                
prove the existence of the transcendent from the empirical, which is impossible. If God were a                
link or beginning of the series then He could not be separated from it and thus also conditioned                  
by causality. However, on the other hand if it were argued that He is separate from the series,                  
there remains no way reason can find to span the gap between pure and contingent existence.                62
Nothing beyond the world of senses can be definitely known to us. This argument is               
epistemically flawed since it misapplies the transcendental principle of causality beyond the            
bounds of the phenomenal world.  In Kant’s own words: 
This principle is applicable only in the sensible world; outside that world it has              
no meaning whatsoever. For the mere intellectual concept of the contingent           
cannot give rise to any synthetic proposition, such as that of causality. The             
principle of causality has no meaning and no criterion for its application save             
only in the sensible world. But in the cosmological proof it is precisely in order               
to enable us to advance beyond the sensible world that it is employed.  63
The chief error of both the ontological and the cosmological arguments is that of projecting the                
subjective transcendental principles on to reality. Thus, infinity and causality are misconstrued as             
physical or external conditions of reality while in reality they are concepts of the mind by means                 
of which objective reality is subjectively apprehended. Moreover, one cannot attribute necessity            
to anything in the phenomenal world, as the cosmological argument does in its inference of the                
necessity of an uncaused cause, since necessity is a formal condition of thought found in our                
reason and not applicable to external reality. In the words of Kant, ‘The concept of necessity is                 
only to be found in our reason, as a formal condition of thought; it does not allow of being                   
hypostatised as a material condition of existence.’  64
c. The Teleological Argument: ​This is the argument that infers the existence of God from the                
order and purposiveness apparent in the universe. Kant, however, objects to this by saying that               
the utmost this argument can do is show that there must be a great architect who designed this                  
universe. Whether this architect is the supreme uncaused cause of the universe can only be               65
established by recourse to the cosmological argument which has already been shown to be              
methodically flawed. The cosmological argument in turn rests on the ontological proof which             
itself proceeds from the error of mistaking a synthetic judgment for an analytical one as has                
already been shown. Thus, Kant nullifies all the three classical arguments for the existence of               
God. The conclusion is that God cannot be known by means of reason alone; neither can He be                  
known on the basis of experience. Consequently, natural theology is not epistemically valid.             
Thus, speculative reason fails to prove or even disprove the existence of God. It has no means to                  
relate to that concept. 
However, though one cannot prove the existence of God, one can at least by means of practical                 
reason and the knowledge of moral obligation postulate the existence of God as ‘the grounds for                
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the necessary connection between virtue and happiness.’ On the basis of an ​a priori knowledge               66
of what is, ​viz. ​the existence of moral laws, one can proceed on to know ​a priori what ought to                    
be, ​viz. the existence of a supreme being ‘as the condition of the possibility of ​their obligatory                 
power.’ This postulation, however, is by use of not theoretical reason related to what is but by                 67
use of practical reason related to what ought to be; for if there were no being behind the moral                   
laws, the moral laws would lack any obligatory power. However, there is still no way in which                 
one can theoretically see the connection between the phenomenal world as is known and the               
transcendent Supreme Being God. Consequently, moral theology’s flawless ideal of God as            
postulated by practical reason needs the aid of transcendental theology dealing with            
transcendental ideas to know transcendent divine reality. In Kant’s own words: 
If, then, there should be a moral theology that can make good this deficiency,              
transcendental theology, which before was problematic only, will prove itself          
indispensable in determining the concept of this supreme being and in constantly            
testing reason, which is so often deceived by sensibility, and which is frequently out of               
harmony with its own ideas. Necessity, infinity, unity, existence outside the world (and             
not as world-soul), eternity as free from conditions of time, omnipresence as free from              
conditions of space, omnipotence, etc. are purely transcendental predicates, and for           
this reason the purified concepts of them, which every theology finds so indispensable,             
are only to be obtained from transcendental theology.  
68
However, there is no way these transcendent predicates can be proved to be the attributes of God.                 
Evidently, reason is imprisoned in its own forms and concepts and has no way to go beyond                 
itself to know anything about the external world except its own analysis of the sensations. This                
can, inevitably, lead to some kind of solipsism. Kant was at least sure that the self as the                  
transcendental unity of apperception (‘I think’) exists and is that which perceives, recollects,             
retains, and knows. He was also assured about the objective reality of the noumenal world as the                 
source of the sensations that the mind decodes by means of its own concepts thus giving rise to                  
phenomena. However, since whatever is known is conditioned by the categories of the mind, a               
transcendental knowledge of the divine by means of these conditional categories becomes            
impossible. None of the classical arguments succeed in proving the existence of God since they               
involve a leap from the concepts of contingency to necessity and causality to non-causality              
without any intermediary concept to bridge the gap between any of them. This is anything but                
being rational. 
Critique of Kant 
The distinction between ​a priori ​and ​a posteriori knowledge that between analytical and             
synthetic judgments once established, Kant easily proceeded to show that the quality of ​a priori               
did not just belong to analytical judgments but to some synthetic judgments too. Since these               
synthetic judgments like ‘2+2=4’, ‘Every effect has a cause’, and ‘Bodies occupy space’             
contained, according to Kant, predicates not contained in the subject, they meant added             
information; in other words the possession of knowledge ​a priori​. According to Kant, then, these               
a priori data formed the conditions according to which all other empirical data were interpreted               
and understood by the mind. The world as one sees or perceives as a result is nothing but what                   
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the mind determines it to look as. Space and time are not objective realities but subjective forms                 
of intuition in which all data is arranged by the mind. Thus, the mind is not able to conceive of                    
anything apart from space and time. 
But what if space is not a form of intuition but a mere negation of objects? According to this                   
view then, space would mean nothing. Consequently, once one knows what something is, then its               
negation becomes readily evident. This doesn’t require any ​a priori ​knowledge of the negation              
equaling a synthetic judgment. The negation, in accordance to the rational principle of the              
exclusive middle, is of analytical nature. Once it is known that A=A and not non-A it                
immediately follows that something is either A or non-A. In the same manner, once through               
experience something is known, its negation, namely, nothing also is known.  
It can, consequently, be postulated that space is the negation of substance, of reality, of being;                
thus, space is nothing, unreality, non-being. Consequently, one does not see things ​in space but               
things alone and their negation, ​viz., ​space. Things do not ​occupy space. For then, what does                
space ​occupy​? Things ​negate space, i.e. nothing. Thus, infinity may be predicated of space in the                
same manner that infinity is predicated of zero. Once this is established, the question whether the                
universe is finite or infinite becomes unnecessary; for it is empirically evident that it cannot be                
materially infinite though it may be spatially infinite. But to say space is infinite is not making a                  
positive assertion of some existent thing but stating a negation. It simply means that things               
negate space and where there is no thing seen, there is nothing (i.e. space) seen. And nothing                 
(zero) is intensively (by divisibility) and extensively (by multiplicity) infinite. Thus, space can be              
infinitely divided and multiplied; yet, it amounts to nothing for it is nothing. 
In this manner, space ceases to be a subjective condition of perception. It is simply the                
apprehension of non-reality. 
Thus, it may be argued that none of the forms or categories that Kant alludes to is ​a priori​.                   
Though one may not perceive reality as it is, being restricted to his senses, one can definitely                 
know much of reality by use of reason. It may also be argued that the categories that Kant labels                   
as ​a priori are in fact categories gained and generalized by reason to assist its deductive faculty.                 
For instance, once one learns that smoke follows fire, the concept of smoke is integrally linked                
with fire thenceforth, until encountered by something contrary to that generalization. In the same              
manner, once one experiences an object in space-time, the concept of object is integrally linked               
with space-time, until encountered by something contrary to that generalization. It is no wonder              
that people have been able to write about two-dimensional space, ​Flatland, and timeless             69
eternity. The same may be said of causality also. 
However, Kant’s contention that the ontological and the cosmological arguments attempt a leap             
from contingency to necessity cannot be disregarded. Still, Kant doesn’t let go off the hope that                
with the help of moral theology, transcendental theology will be able to someway establish the               
existence of God as a necessary, absolute, perfect, transcendent, and infinite being. The question              
is, if experience doesn’t permit us to predicate such transcendental attributes to any             
phenomenally experienced object, on what basis does rational theology attribute the same to             
God? Evidently, as had been already stated earlier, reason in its attempt to find a ground for the                  
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whole phenomena tends to find it in some existence that transcends this phenomenal world.              
However, since it attempts to establish the science of this divine reality on the basis of reason                 
alone, it is left with nothing but itself alone in the search. Further, it finds that though the world                   
is contingent, reason itself cannot be contingent but possesses the attributes of unity, necessity,              
universality, immutability, and transcendence without which it cannot find certainty of           
knowledge or know the truth. Now, reason doesn’t mean a man or a woman who may reason                 
fallaciously. Reason, here means the faculty of rational beings that is both the judge and law of                 
all truth. In other words, it is by use of reason that one comes to know truth from error; and to                     
use reason means nothing but to infer on the basis of the laws of reasoning. But inference is only                   
possible when provided with data from experience. However, in reasoning towards ultimate            
reality, one is faced with the problems of plurality, contingency, finitude, change, and             
immanence. And since the rational criterion disallows the finality of anything of such nature, so               
unity, necessity, infinity, immutability, and transcendence are attributed to divine reality with the             
consequence that one is not sure what this being with such qualities looks like. One may reason                 
that such attributes belong to God, but one cannot conceive of anyone possessing such attributes.               
Such attributes frustrate human imagination. On the other hand, as Kant rightly stated, there was               
no means by which to bridge the gap between this transcendental conception and the phenomenal               
world. No wonder then, that rationalism in both ancient Greece and India had tended towards               
monism and non-dualism in their attempt to fuse the transcendent with the immanent. Thus, the               
plurality and contingency of the universe was replaced with the unity or non-duality and the               
necessity of the same. 
In conclusion, Kant well understood that the attempt to know God is severely handicapped by the                
limitations of data. His theory of forms and concepts does evoke some objections. However, his               
understanding of the failure of reason in bridging the gap between its notion of a necessary being                 
and a contingent world is important. It has also been seen that the attributes that reason                
predicates of divine reality in monism, non-dualism, or any rational theology reflect the very              
qualities recognized as fundamental to something being called rational or true. It has, therefore,              
been said that the predication or projection of the transcendental attributes on to ultimate reality               
is nothing but a way in which reason attempts to establish the fundamental and ultimate nature of                 
reality on the basis of rational principles. However, this immediately creates a gap between              
ultimate reality and phenomenal reality. The relation is unexplainable.  
In light of this discovery, one can clearly see why the monists and non-dualists attempted to fuse                 
the concept of a transcendental reality with that of phenomenal reality. Either the phenomenal              
reality is true or the transcendental reality is true. Since the phenomenal reality cannot be true                
being subject to change, transcendental reality alone must be true. On the other hand, there exists                
the certainty of only one thing: the self (‘I think, therefore I am’). Consequently, reason reaches                
its final position when it fuses the concept of transcendence and immanence into a non-dual self                
as the substratum to all illusory phenomenal experience. 
This fusion is expected as it also solves the problem of estrangement or alienation. Estrangement               
is the experience of existential frustration that man goes through on the failure of reason to find                 
an absolute basis for his existence or its failure to bridge the gap between the transcendent and                 
his own phenomenal experience. It produces the feeling of existential alienation, of being cut off               
from reality itself, and the loss of hope. Since a transcendent beyond can neither be proved nor                 70
disproved, the only one possibility remaining is to reject the ‘subject and predicate alike,’ to use                
Kant’s own terms, of phenomenal experience and build up a theory that in some manner               
establishes the unity, eternality and necessity of being. This is what non-dualism exactly does: it               
fuses the concept of the transcendent with the immanent in supportive-framework--theory of            
Maya, ​which though maintaining the lesser reality of the phenomenal world contends for a              
reality that transcends the concept of phenomena. Thus, the path of pure reason can be seen to                 
have led to monism and non-dualism. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, it may be said that though reason is a useful instrument in knowing several things,                 
its use is handicapped in the absence of any empirical data. However, its quest for absolute                
certainty cannot be disregarded. It seeks to know truth as exclusive, absolute, immutable, and              
final. Such a quest becomes appropriate when considering truth regarding things. However,            
when this quest is directed towards knowing the ultimate absolute or final truth of reality, reason                
is left with nothing but itself and its standard of measurement. Norman Geisler gives three               
reasons for the inadequacy of reason for divine knowledge. First, logic is only a negative test for                 
truth. It can eliminate what is false but cannot in and of itself establish what must be true. In                   71
other words, reason is empty of real knowledge, i.e. knowledge of reality. Thus, it needs               
empirical data to deal with but cannot by itself without help of experience know the things.                
Second, there are no rationally inescapable arguments for the existence of God (the monotheistic              
God not the monist one) because it is always logically possible that nothing ever existed               
including God. However, unlike Geisler, it has been seen that the undeniability of Being itself               72
despite the deniability of everything else leads to monism and non-dualism. Geisler’s third             
problem with rational epistemics is a strong one. He argues that there is no rationally inescapable                
way of establishing the first principles of reasoning. In other words, if all knowledge must be                73
based on and certified by reason to be true, what is it that certifies reason? Geisler concludes that                  
rationalism ‘is without a necessary rational basis of its own.’  74
Kant’s epistemology shows that there is no way in which one can bridge the chasm between the                 
idea of a transcendent God and the phenomenal world. Even in the ontological argument, there is                
no way to show how the idea of God and the argument itself could necessitate the existence of                  
God. The rational argument was just rational and could not necessitate the existence of anything               
by virtue of it. Rational arguments can at the most prove only logical necessity but never                
ontological necessity. Thus, the rational quest was left with a great chasm between rational              
possibility and empirical reality. No wonder then, this quest has been seen in the past to have led,                  
in the absence of any empirical evidence regarding the existence of an absolute to monism and                75
non-dualism, wherein one finds a fusion of the transcendent with immanent reality to the extent               
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of the rejection of the phenomenal world as false. However, since the epistemic procedure              
involved the use of reason without and at the expense of empirical data, or the devaluation of it,                  
reason left with nothing but itself cannot be expected to provide any information about external               
reality, far long the knowledge of God. In contrast to pantheism, which stresses the immanence               
of God, monism and non-dualism, being true to their rationalistic ideal, stress on transcendence,              
as that nature of God by which he is different and above the ​phenomenal ​world. The real world                  
is not plural as phenomenon shows but non-dual. In advaita philosophy, the self as the subjective                
part in the noetic process is postulated as the only reality. This is an inescapable conclusion                
seeing that the only thing reason seems to be sure of is of the thinking self (the ‘I think, therefore                    
I am’).  
Thus, reason alone and by itself cannot be considered to be a reliable guide to the knowledge of                  
God. It has been seen that pure rational epistemics leads to monism and non-dualism, which are                
counter-empirical philosophies and reflections of the reason itself. Consequently, it may be            
concluded that reason cleft from experience cannot be a perfectly reliable guide to the knowledge               
of divine reality.  
 
